


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RECENT COMMUNIST MILITARY  
AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM

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13 July 1973  
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SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
AND METHODS INVOLVED

RECENT COMMUNIST MILITARY  
AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM

There is virtually no direct information on military imports by North Vietnam since the signing of the Paris Agreements on 27 January. The key PRC/North Vietnam border crossing, where large amounts of military hardware were seen prior to the cease-fire, has been photographed only a few times since then, and cloud cover has made most of this photography of little value.

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But beyond that, there have been only a few reports of military supplies moving through China to North Vietnam. A few Communist diplomats, including Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, have said that military aid to North Vietnam has been reduced.

Logic would suggest a continuation of military aid, but at a greatly reduced level. North Vietnam's requirement for air defense equipment and ammunition, always a major part of the military aid package, is only a small fraction of past levels. Moreover, expenditures of other types of ammunition have also fallen sharply. On the other hand, the high level of North Vietnam's logistical activity during the recently concluded dry season directed toward building military stocks in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam suggests that Hanoi is not hurting for military equipment. Traditionally, such a high level of activity at the lower end of the logistic funnel has been accompanied by a corresponding high level of activity at the top of the funnel -- military aid from the USSR and the PRC -- but there is no conclusive proof that such has been the case. Indeed, the recent activity could be a readjustment of internal stockpiles.

In sum, the evidence with respect to current levels of military aid is sketchy and inconclusive. It does suggest that North Vietnam has continued to receive military aid, but at greatly reduced levels from the high pace of deliveries that characterized the pre-cease-fire period.

North Vietnam's major Communist donors have continued to provide economic aid to Hanoi since the cease-fire under the terms of the 1973 aid and trade agreements. This aid has included both commodity assistance to sustain the economy and technical assistance for the reconstruction effort now under way. Furthermore, both the PRC and the USSR have affirmed their willingness to make long-term commitments to Hanoi by sending technicians to assist in reconstruction, and the PRC has signed economic and military aid agreements for 1974.


By any measure, the flow of imports from the Communist suppliers has been quite large. Shipments of all types of goods -- food, fertilizer, petroleum, and industrial materials and equipment -- via road, rail, and sea during February-June 1973 nearly match the 690,000 metric tons observed in the five months prior to the cease-fire. If an estimate for petroleum deliveries by pipeline is included, total imports from the Communist suppliers since the cease-fire might well approach the 975,000 tons of goods delivered to North Vietnam during February-June 1971, when North Vietnam's ports were operating at full capacity.

Discussion

Military Aid

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Evidence



2. The most recent evidence appeared on 25 June, when intercepted radar signals indicated the probable initial presence of the TALL KING radar near Phuc Yen airfield in North Vietnam. The TALL KING is an early warning radar produced by the USSR which will give the North Vietnamese a much greater ability to track US manned reconnaissance platforms. Similarly, on 14 April ELINT from the Hanoi area revealed the probable initial presence of the FLAP WHEEL radar in North Vietnam. This fire-control radar is generally associated with the 57-mm antiaircraft gun. It is a marked improvement over the earlier generation FIRECAN radar in that it is capable of performing its own acquisition, has an onboard computer, and is able to operate more efficiently in a jamming environment. Although we have no direct information on when these radars arrived in North Vietnam, Hanoi has traditionally deployed new equipment shortly after it has arrived in North Vietnam.



For example, thus far in 1973, about 2,700 trucks have

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been detected [REDACTED] arriving in North Vietnam from other Communist countries, as shown in the following tabulation:

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	<u>USSR</u>	<u>PRC</u>	<u>Eastern Europe</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total	1,810	590	340	2,740
Jan	10	180	40	230
Feb	360	410	--	770
Mar	430	--	200	630
Apr	300	--	--	300
May	30	--	40	70
Jun	680	--	60	740

This total is even greater than the 2,200 trucks observed being delivered during the same period last year when the Communists were supporting their offensive. Although some of these trucks may be destined for the civilian economy, there is little doubt that many are going to military units.

4. [REDACTED]

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In April, two Soviet ships delivered six MI-10 helicopters to Haiphong. These craft -- with a lift capability of some 13 tons each -- have a variety of military and civilian applications, including construction work and passenger and freight hauling.

5. Finally, there has been a smattering of reported observations of military shipments. A South Vietnamese prisoner of war recently returned from North Vietnam reported that he was told by other POWs that they had observed convoys of trucks carrying military supplies near the Chinese border as late as February 1973. Another source reported

in late March observing at Nan-ning, in southern China, trucks loaded with food and weapons moving toward North Vietnam.

Logistic Activity Within Indochina

6. There is no doubt that a great deal of Communist military logistic activity has been taking place throughout Indochina since the cease-fire. A 4 July intercept, for example, revealed the movement of 1,600 tons of ordnance through the North Vietnamese Panhandle during an unspecified time period. [REDACTED] also has revealed that more than 1,000 vehicles transited the Dong Hoi area in southern North Vietnam during June. [REDACTED]

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7. Throughout the war, the North Vietnamese have practiced a supply stockpiling policy which requires that, for every type of ordnance or military equipment provided to the front line forces, they maintain very large stockpiles in rear base areas. It could be argued that the recent activity would not have taken place if Hanoi did not feel confident of receiving continued military aid. However, if Hanoi were not contemplating an early return to major military action, the need to be assured of having replacement stocks already in hand would not be controlling -- they could be built up over time.


8. Since the cease-fire, we have also received reports [REDACTED] detailing the movement of "new" military equipment through North Vietnam. For example, one of these sources reported that in mid-March 1973 he saw a convoy of 13 SA-2 surface-to-air missiles moving on the outskirts of Haiphong toward the city. From the condition of the tires and paint, he concluded that the missiles and "launch trucks" were new. In contrast to such missiles which he had observed earlier, these missiles were camouflaged with yellow, brown, and green paint. We have no way of telling whether the referenced missiles have been brought into North Vietnam since the cease-fire, or were simply being deployed out of pre-cease-fire stocks.

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9. Finally it would seem likely that Communist military assistance would at least continue to the extent necessary to replace and maintain North Vietnam's present forces. North Vietnam's weapons production capability is limited to small arms and ammunition. Heavy equipment requires foreign aid for spare parts and probably for repairs or maintenance as well. In case large numbers of SA-3 missiles were received just before the cease-fire, the Soviets will almost certainly have to provide continued training and replacement parts if Hanoi is to make full use of the equipment. Similarly, continuing Chinese interest in the status of North Vietnamese military hardware is evident in the recent radar maintenance tour by Chinese technicians in North Vietnam and by the return of North Vietnam's remaining MIG-17s which were stationed in China.

#### Diplomatic and Political Reporting


10. Political sources have given conflicting reports as to whether military aid is continuing.



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On 8 June, China and North Vietnam concluded aid negotiations and signed a military and economic aid pact for 1974, indicating that this aid will continue. The North Vietnamese leaders including Party First Secretary Le Duan and Premier Pham Van Dong are now in Moscow negotiating a 1974 Soviet aid agreement. Soviet press accounts are stressing the economic rather than the military

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side of the assistance as the Chinese did when the North Vietnamese were in Peking.

12. In any case, whether or not North Vietnam and its allies intend to abide by the spirit of the cease-fire and curtail military imports, it seems likely that there has been a slackening of such imports. For one thing, with the halt in US air operations over North Vietnam, Hanoi's requirement for antiaircraft ammunition, surface-to-air missiles, and other types of air defense equipment has fallen to only a fraction of its previous level. Moreover, the overall level of fighting throughout Indochina has declined markedly in recent months, and, consequently, the need to replace ground equipment and ammunition has also fallen.

#### Economic Aid

##### Seaborne Imports

13. North Vietnam continues to receive a substantial volume of imports by sea, mainly from the USSR and the PRC. About 575,000 tons of cargo have been delivered since the cease-fire, slightly greater than deliveries in the five months preceding the signing of the accord, when 568,000 tons arrived (see Table 1). Receipts in 1973 are, of course, off considerably, compared with those in the same calendar period in 1971, when 958,000 tons arrived, largely because of continuing operational problems at Haiphong. Nonetheless, deliveries have increased month by month since the cease-fire, mainly on the strength of imports from the USSR, and shipments in June 1973 of more than 140,000 tons were the highest monthly total since the mining in May 1972. In all, the USSR has supplied some 314,000 tons (55% of the total), while the Chinese have sent 129,000 tons.

14. Food imports, at 222,000 tons, are greater than for the five-month period preceding the cease-fire and remain the single most important category. Seaborne petroleum imports -- 95,000 tons since the cease-fire -- virtually all from the USSR, are down sharply from the pre-cess-fire period, but requirements are almost certainly being satisfied by the two overland pipelines linking North Vietnam and the PRC. Other seaborne imports have included fertilizer, machinery and equipment, vehicles, and miscellaneous and unidentified cargo.

Table 1  
North Vietnam's Seaborne Imports, By Origin<sup>1/</sup>

Thousand Metric Tons								
	Feb-Jun 1971	Pre-Cease-fire (Sep 1972-Jan 1973)	Total	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun
Total	958	568	575	88	115	130	100	142
USSR	540	439	314	49	70	88	40	67
PRC	271	52	129	19	29	32	24	25
Other	147	77	133	20	16	10	36	51
Food	276	191	222	25	39	53	41	65
USSR	161	142	112	10	26	26	21	29
PRC	69	-	53	3	13	20	10	7
Other	46	49	57	12	-	7	10	28
Petroleum	191	207	95	15	27	29	Negl.	24
USSR	179	203	92	15	26	28	-	23
PRC	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	1	4	3	-	1	1	Negl.	1
Fertilizer	142	37	66	12	8	14	12	20
USSR	94	33	46	9	5	14	12	6
PRC	14	-	10	-	3	-	-	7
Other	34	4	10	3	-	-	-	7
Miscellaneous and uniden- tified	350	133	190	36	41	34	46	33
USSR	107	61	63	15	13	20	7	8
PRC	176	52	66	16	13	12	14	11
Other	67	20	61	5	15	2	25	14

1. Including deliveries to PRC ports for North Vietnam. June data are preliminary. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

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15. Since late February, foreign ships have, with one exception, taken their cargoes directly to North Vietnam, nearly all to the Haiphong area, instead of to Chinese ports for transshipment overland. Despite the completion of US mineclearing in late June, silting has reduced channel depths at Haiphong, limiting the size of vessels that may enter the port area. Large dry cargo ships and some smaller ones continue to discharge part of their cargoes onto lighters at anchorages outside of the harbor. Haiphong is also having some difficulty handling Soviet tankers, reflecting both the reduced capacity of bombed-out storage facilities and the shortage of lightering craft. The USSR has moved to help alleviate tanker congestion in Haiphong by sending a large tanker (11,000 DWT) for floating storage. China is scheduled to transfer two small tankers to North Vietnam, possibly for similar use, but their arrival has not been noted.

#### Overland Imports

16. The rapid pace of overland imports established in 1972 has continued into 1973. There is, however, conflicting evidence as to whether some slowdown may have occurred in recent months. Solely on the basis of observed deliveries, overland imports continue to exceed by wide margins shipments noted during any comparable time period prior to the mining of the ports, such as February-June 1971, when shipments of less than 18,000 tons were counted. Receipts of all types of goods by this mode observed since January total about 98,000 tons, compared with about 120,000 tons in the five months preceding the cease-fire (see Table 2). Lower foodstuff deliveries account for most of a recent decline in observed overland receipts, largely as a result of a cutback in Soviet shipments during April-June. Imports of trucks, metal products, and explosives noted in transit are running at a faster rate than during the pre-cease-fire period, while packaged petroleum and other products con-

1. This probably reflects increasing Soviet sea-borne shipments of food (see paragraphs 13-15).

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tinue to arrive in substantial quantities. The USSR remains the dominant supplier of observed overland imports, accounting for nearly 75% of the total, while China supplies nearly 20%.

17. Delivery schedules intercepted on occasion, however, strongly suggest both that actual overland deliveries are substantially higher than observed shipments and that China may well be Hanoi's major supplier. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the following projected deliveries from the PRC.

Commodity and Mode of Transport	Thousand Metric Tons						
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July
Foodstuffs <sup>1/</sup>	<u>72</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>68-73</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>NA</u>
Seaborne	9	30	30-35	37	25	21	--
Overland	28	34	38	26	22	11	--
Unspecified	35	--	--	--	--	--	--
Petroleum	<u>65</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>66</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>53</u>
Pipeline	41	--	--	56	56	--	44
Rail	19	--	--	10	11	--	9
Unspecified	5	--	--	--	--	--	--
Construction explosives (all overland)	0.3	NA	NA	NA	0.8	NA	0.9
Other mineral products (all overland)	61	NA	NA	72	75	NA	59

1. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

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Table 2 25X1D1a  
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North Vietnam: Overland Imports [REDACTED] by Commodity and Origin

	Metric Tons							
	Feb-June 1971 <sup>1/</sup>	Five Months Pre-Cease-fire (Sep 1972-Jan 1973)	Post-Cease-fire 1973					
			Total <sup>2/</sup>	February	March	April	May	June
Total	<u>17,930</u>	<u>120,400</u>	<u>98,270</u>	<u>26,038</u>	<u>46,671</u>	<u>8,429</u>	<u>7,985</u>	<u>9,140</u>
USSR	4,420	85,720	72,190	23,102	39,148	3,597	1,585	4,755
PRC	13,510	14,900	18,440	2,330	3,616	3,485	5,926	3,081
Other	--	19,780	7,640	606	3,907	1,347	474	1,304
Food	<u>90</u>	<u>90,000</u>	<u>63,450</u>	<u>20,182</u>	<u>40,044</u>	<u>1,970</u>	<u>285</u>	<u>969</u>
USSR	--	71,700	54,030	19,921	34,109	--	--	--
PRC	--	3,600	6,040	261	2,927	1,595	285	969
Other	--	14,700	3,380	--	3,008	375	--	--
Fertilizer	<u>--</u>	<u>1,490</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>
USSR	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PRC	--	1,490	--	--	--	--	--	--
Other	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Petroleum	<u>9,150</u>	<u>10,800</u>	<u>6,780</u>	<u>1,551</u>	<u>1,603</u>	<u>1,223</u>	<u>1,206</u>	<u>1,195</u>
USSR	150	10,000	6,350	1,471	1,470	1,008	1,206	1,195
PRC	9,000	--	140	--	--	136	--	--
Other	--	800	290	80	133	79	--	--

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Table 2 25X1D1a NSA  
 North Vietnam: Overland Imports [REDACTED] by Commodity and Origin<sup>1/</sup>  
 (Continued)

	Feb-June 1971 <sup>1/</sup>	Five Months Pre-Cease-fire (Sep 1972-Jan 1973)	Metric Tons				
			Total <sup>2/</sup>	February	March	April	May June
Metals	10	4,150	7,390	526	825	693	4,089 1,258
USSR	--	50	--	--	--	--	--
PRC	--	600	4,090	--	90	--	--
Other	--	3,500	3,300	526	735	693	4,000 89 1,258
Machinery	40	1,970	380	180	78	113	-- 11
USSR	--	1,800	60	--	--	57	-- 2
PRC	--	100	300	180	59	56	-- 9
Other	--	70	20	--	19	--	--
<sup>12</sup> Explosives	4,020	560	2,970	--	522	1,041	936 471
USSR	1,150	350	1,710	--	522	410	307 471
PRC	2,870	210	1,260	--	--	631	629 --
Other	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Vehicles	3,240	5,870	9,590	2,850	2,192	1,388	72 3,087
USSR	2,720	120	7,950	1,210	2,192	1,388	72 3,087
PRC	520	5,750	1,640	1,640	--	--	--
Other	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Other	1,380	5,560	7,703	749	1,407	2,001	1,397 2,149
USSR	--	1,700	2,090	500	855	734	-- --
PRC	--	3,150	4,970	249	540	1,067	1,012 2,103
Other	--	710	640	--	12	200	385 46

1. Totals will not add to the totals shown, because of unassigned commodity-by-country data.  
 2. Data have been rounded to the nearest 10 metric tons.

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### Aid Negotiations

18. Hanoi's continuing dependence on its Communist suppliers is reflected both in negotiations for current transactions and for 1974 aid agreements. [REDACTED] ongoing negotiations for such varied items as trucks, jeeps, vessels, agricultural machinery, fertilizers, construction equipment, explosives, communications equipment, and other industrial goods. 25X1D1a NSA

19. In addition to current transactions, however, Hanoi has also obtained commitments from the Communist suppliers for aid in 1974. Le Duan traveled abroad for the first time since 1966 as he and Pham Van Dong led a delegation to Peking in early June and to Moscow in early July to thank the Communist allies for their assistance during the war and to sign aid agreements for 1974. On 8 June the delegation signed an agreement on economic and military assistance from China in 1974. Le Duan then returned to Hanoi while Pham Van Dong led the delegation to Mongolia and North Korea to sign similar agreements prior to the visit to Moscow, which again was headed by Le Duan. During that visit, the Moscow press loudly trumpeted past Soviet military and economic assistance to North Vietnam and indicated continuing Soviet support for Hanoi. In addition, Soviet Party leader Brezhnev announced at a luncheon honoring the North Vietnamese leaders that Moscow was canceling all of Hanoi's debts for past Soviet aid.

### Reconstruction Assistance

20. Despite a resumption of Soviet and Chinese technical assistance to North Vietnam, reconstruction thus far has achieved only modest results, suggesting increased requirements for Communist aid as activity picks up. Moscow has sent specialists to North Vietnam for such varied tasks as electric powerplant construction, coal mining, port construction, marine equipment, and public health. Work is in progress to repair the large, important hydroelectric powerplant at Thac Ba, and plans apparently have been completed to begin construction of an even larger hydroelectric installation on the Da River. In addition, the USSR

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has contracted to train North Vietnamese bridge, road, and port construction teams, as well as drivers, river pilots, and three groups of surveyors. Chinese assistance is represented by the arrival of several hundred specialists since the cease-fire to work on such projects as restoration of the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex, a 100-mw thermal powerplant under construction at Ninh Binh, the Bac Giang chemical complex, and other unspecified projects. China has also agreed to accept substantial numbers of North Vietnamese trainees for instruction in various specialties, including agriculture and construction.

21. While foreign assistance for capital projects appears to be increasing steadily [REDACTED] more active contracts, efforts during the first half of this year seem to have been directed largely toward preparing damage assessments and executing orders for machinery replacements.

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[REDACTED] with minor exception damaged industrial facilities remained in basically the same condition as when last observed in January. It is unlikely that the general status of repairs has changed significantly since May. Moreover, the usual construction slowdown that occurs during the June-September rainy season probably will limit reconstruction progress until near year's end.

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